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Effect of corporate governance on default risk in Financial VS. Non-financial 
firms: Canada Evidence  
Yajing Zhang 
This paper investigates the influence of corporate governance structures on the credit 
risks of Canadian firms from the perspective of bondholders after the 2007-2008 
financial crisis. Default probabilities calculated from Black-Scholes/ Merton Distance 
to Default type models are used to measure firms credit risks. Based on these 
measures, Canadian financial firms actually show higher risk than non-financial firms 
over the financial crisis. This may be explained by the high exposure of Canadian 
financial firms to US markets during the period of the crisis. However, in the 
transition to the post financial crisis period, the risk of financial firms decreases more 
rapidly than that of industrial firms. With the exception of board size and CEO duality, 
most governance mechanisms examine, including insider ownership, board 
independence, institutional ownership, financial transparency and compensation 
committee independence, have differential impacts on financial vs. non-financial 
firms. Finally, we find that Canadian firms headquartered in Quebec have higher 
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Assessing firm risk and its underlying determinants are at the forefront of 
concerns of finance scholars, policymakers and practitioners, particularly since the 
2007-8 global financial crisis. The Financial Stability Board of the Bank for 
International Settlements deems credit risk to be a pivotal factor underlying the crisis 
and ensuing liquidity panic. This risk has been linked to poor governance practices, 
although only a few studies have looked at how governance affects credit risk directly. 
Most of the extant evidence in this regard concerns US firms. (e.g., Aebi, Sabato, and 
Schmid, 2012; Erkens, Hung, Matos, 2012, Switzer and Wang, 2013a, 2013b). The 
latter use CDS spreads as their measure of risk, and show that the governance 
mechanisms have differential impacts for financial vs. non-financial firms. Only a few 
studies have looked at non-US firms (e.g. Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Liu, Uchida, and 
Yang, 2012). This paper looks to extend our understanding of how governance affects 
credit risk by focusing on Canadian financial and non-financial firms. It has been a 
popular view that Canadian firms, especially financial firms, suffered less risk during 
the crisis because of the soundness of the financial system. 1 This paper seeks to 
quantify the actual risk exposure of financial firms vs. financial firms in Canada. In 
addition, the paper explores the extent to which governance mechanisms contribute to 
the underlying stability of Canadian firms during and after the crisis period. The study 
extends Switzer and Wang (2013a, 2013b), and looks at risk as measured by five 
years default probabilities both over the financial crisis period as well as over the post 
financial crisis period. The study also controls for regional and industry effects to 
capture both the distributional differences of economic activity across the country, as 
well as possible effects of differential regional regulatory regimes across the 
provinces.  
In contrast with the US, there is no unified securities regulator in Canada. One 
of the concerns of The Expert Panel on Securities Regulation appointed by the 
Canadian Federal Government is that the current system is problematic for investors 
due to the different allocations to securities regulation, which results in variations in 
policy development, supervision, and enforcement activities across the jurisdictions. 
Such variations are posited to give rise to different levels of investor protection, and 
                                                        
1 As Lane (2013) notes: Canada’s banking system was rated “the soundest in the world” by The 




in turn, risk exposure depending on where the firm is domiciled. 2   Furthermore, 
variations in political uncertainty across different regions of Canada may affect the 
riskiness of firms. For example, Tirtiroglu, Bhabra, and Lel (JBF, 2004) show that the 
market reacts differently to business relocations in Canada that depending on region. 
In particular, they provide evidence that relocations from Quebec, which has been a 
province with ongoing political instability, are favorable to firms’ shareholders. 3  
Overall, the results of this study suggest that Canadian financial firms actually 
show higher risk than non-financial firms over the financial crisis. This may be 
explained by the high exposure of Canadian financial firms to US markets during the 
period of the crisis. However, in the transition to the post financial crisis period, the 
risk of financial firms decreases more rapidly than that of industrial firms. We find 
that while board size and CEO duality have similar effects across both financial and 
non-financial variables, most of the other governance variable examined such as 
board independence, institutional ownership, financial transparency and compensation 
committee independence, have differential impacts on financial vs. non-financial 
firms. We also find a non-linear convex (concave) relationship between insider 
ownership and default risk in non-financial (financial) firms. The concave relationship 
for financial firms has an inflection point of 33% for insider ownership. After 
considering industry effects, board size and board independence have more important 
effects on the default risk of the “big five” banks relative to other financial firms. 
Board independence, CEO duality and compensation independence serve as 
significant factors contributing to default risk in the mining industry. Finally, the 
results concerning regional effects, which may be due to political uncertainty 
differences and/or regulatory regime differences, are mixed. In all OLS regression 
models, default probabilities are not affected by provincial domicile of the firms. On 
the other hand, using the Fama-Macbeth model, both financial and non-financial firms 
that are domiciled in Quebec have higher default probabilities than their counterparts 
in others provinces.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a brief 
review of the literature. Section III introduces the hypotheses to be tested. A 
description of the data and the methodology are provided in Section IV. Empirical 
                                                        
2 See http://www.expertpanel.ca/eng/ 
3 Beaulieu, Cosset and Essaddam (2006) show that the effects of uncertainty resolution in Quebec 




results are presented in section V.  The paper concludes with a summary in section VI. 
 
2. Literature Review 
When the value of a firm’s assets is lower than the value of its aggregate debt, 
default occurs. There are a few variables that have served as proxies for default 
probability or cost of debt financing in the extant literature. However, there is no 
consensus in the literature on the best proxy available to measure firm credit risk.  
Credit swap spreads (CDS) are a popular measure used in a number of studies (see e.g. 
Berndt et al 2005, Acharya 2007, and Carlson and Lazrak 2010). The advantages to 
using CDS are that their prices are mainly driven by default risk and CDS spreads can 
effectively reflect default relevant market information, where credit default swap is a 
contract providing protection for company to against default and credit default swap 
spreads are the cost of company against default. However, credit default swap spreads 
include counterparty credit risk because CDS market is a dealer market, and not all 
companies have credit default swap, meaning that the sample automatically delete 
companies without having credit default swaps and there is a bias in sample selection.  
Furthermore, very few companies in Canada have CDS outstanding that can provide a 
meaningful sample size for analysis. Allowing for limits of CDS spreads, Klock, 
Mansi and Maxwell (2005) use the excess yield of corporate bond over risk free rate 
to measure the cost of debt financing. Although the theory holds that N-year CDS 
spread should be almost equal to the excess yield of corporate bond over its risk-free 
rate, some researchers state that credit swap spreads are highly different from 
corporate bond yield spreads and that corporate bond yields are driven by default risk 
and illiquidity risk (Chen, Lesmond & Wei, 2007; Hull, Predescu & White, 2004). 
Hence, there are some problems with using corporate bond yields to measure default 
risk. In contrast with bond yield spreads, and CDS spreads, default probability, 
calculated from Black-Scholes/ Merton Distance to Default type models is used to 
measure firm credit risk (Duffie, Saita & Wang, 2007; Bharath & Shumway, 2008, 
Switzer and Wang, 2013a). In this study, we use the Bloomberg five years default 
probabilities that are based by Merton distance to default model to measure firm 
default risk.  
Driven by the separation between the ownership and control, agency costs that 
can increase firm default risk represent a central concern in corporate governance. 
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Jensen and Meckling (1976) show that there are two types of conflicts: a) the conflicts 
between shareholders and bondholders; and b) the conflict between managers and 
shareholders. One conflict between shareholders and bondholders arises because 
shareholders can benefit from investing riskier projects and enjoy most of profits if 
riskier projects are successful, while bondholders bear the consequence if riskier 
projects fail, resulting that bondholders demand a higher risk premium. Conflicts 
between managers and shareholders arise because managers may not obtain the full 
benefits of acting in shareholder’s best interests and may transfer corporate resources 
to their own private benefits.  
How to mitigate these conflicts is the aim of corporate governance. One 
solution is debt financing. On the one hand, debt financing can decrease conflicts 
between managers and equity holders by reducing free cash-flow of the firm. For 
instance, assuming that managers always want to invest all available funds even 
though investors prefer to be paid by cash, Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1991) argue that 
increases in debt will reduce the amount of free cash available for managers to do 
overinvestment. Also, if the high level of debt induces firm bankruptcy and managers 
who care about their reputation are afraid of bankruptcy, then debt can provide an 
incentive for managers to pursue fewer personal benefits, because this behavior 
reduces the probability of default (Grossman & Hart, 1982). On the other hand, 
increased debt financing will increase the conflicts between bondholders and 
shareholders. High level of debt financing not only can increase default probabilities, 
but also can increase the conflicts between equity holders and bondholders because 
shareholders can transfer more wealth from bondholders to themselves. Myers (1977) 
finds that equity holders are more likely to refuse to invest in value-increasing 
projects when firms are near bankruptcy, because once company goes bankrupt, 
shareholders lose the entire cost of their investments, and are unable to capture the 
full gains of successful investments. Hence, a higher level of debt may cause 
shareholders to reject value-increasing projects when a firm is in a state of financial 
stress. Furthermore, shareholders are likely to invest in value-decreasing projects at 
the expense of bondholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Overall, whether debt 
financing alleviates these conflicts and whether reduced conflicts between managers 
and shareholders can offset increased conflicts between bondholders and shareholders 
remain as empirical matters that can be tested. 
As discussed above, conflicts are more complicated for levered firms. 
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Shareholders of levered firms may prefer investing in riskier projects at the expense 
of creditors, which is the risk shifting problem introduced by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976). Firms can use more strict covenants to reduce the agency cost of debt 
financing (Smith and Warner, 1979); however, the risk-shifting problem endures even 
with covenants in place. Mitigating this problem is favorable to bondholders. Thus, 
we expect that firms with corporate governance mechanisms that favor shareholders 
will have higher default risk. In addition, managers can play an important role in 
coordinating the relationship between equity holders and bondholders. Managers of 
highly levered firms who care about the loss of reputation in the event of bankruptcy, 
can decrease default probability in some degree. In order to align managers with 
shareholders, shareholders may choose to transfer a fraction of the firm`s ownership 
to managers. When we superficially view this phenomenon, we may conclude that 
higher insider ownership will be associated with higher default probability because 
the alignment between managers and shareholders improves the cost of financing. In 
fact, the relationship between managerial ownership and default risk is more complex. 
Some papers show that there exists a non-linear relationship between insider 
ownership and default probability because of incentive alignment and entrenchment 
effects (Switzer and Wang 2013, Kim & Lu, 2011). As is shown in these papers, the 
governance issue is very complicated and involves many different stakeholder 
interests and claims.  
Although different governance mechanisms may be exploited to address the 
conflicts described above, many scholars use an governance index, such as the 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2001) (GIM) index to measure good or bad governance 
(Bhagat & Bolton, 2008; Klock, Mansi and Maxwell, 2005); this index focuses 
antitakeover provisions that impede shareholder’s rights and shift the balance of 
power between managers and shareholders. Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2001) use 
24 antitakeover provisions to construct a governance index (GIM-index) as a proxy 
for levels of shareholder’s rights, where higher GIM index score represents weaker 
shareholder rights and stronger manager’s rights. Several papers explores how GIM 
index impact on firm performance and riskiness. Gompers et al (2001) show that GIM 
index is negatively related with profits and sales growth, but is positively associated 
with corporate acquisitions and capital expenditures. Klock, Mansi and Maxwell 
(2005) suggest that companies with lower GIM-index (favoring shareholder’s rights) 
have higher cost of debt financing, which means that bondholders prefer shareholders 
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having lower rights. According to these papers, it is difficult for us to judge whether 
higher GIM-index represents good or bad corporate governance and it is also 
dangerous for us to only use this index as a proxy for measuring corporate quality 
because it presumes that corporate governance only serves shareholder’s interests and 
ignores that bondholders and managers are also important parts of corporate 
governance. In addition, from the constitution of GIM index, it is easier for us to see 
that GIM mainly considering company’s ability for antitakeover is a proxy for 
shareholder’s rights and that many papers discuss the relationship between 
governance and firm aspects from shareholder’s perspective.  
Default probabilities are closely related with expectations of creditors such as 
bondholders. Our paper looks at corporate governance in Canada from the perspective 
of creditors. broader perspective, that not only includes shareholder’s rights vs. 
manager’s rights, but also focuses on how individual governance mechanisms, that 
may be substitutes or complements, as they impact on firm default probabilities.  
 
3. Hypothesis 
As mentioned above, firms with the highest GIM index score are referred to as 
having the weakest shareholders rights. However, this measure primarily considers 
antitakeover abilities of firms and ignores others the separate effects of individual 
corporate governance factors, such as board structure, ownership structure, committee 
independence, that may work independently or as substitutes or as complement. This 
paper considers the impact of several governance mechanisms for Canadian firms, 
and is closely related to Switzer and Wang (2013a). Similar to Switzer and Wang 
(2013), we use several proxies for governance that have been shown to impact on firm 
default risk in the US. However, we also look at the effects of regional differences 
that may capture both the differential political risk as well as regulatory jurisdiction 
differences that may affect the governance environment and the firm`s riskiness.  As 
in Switzer and Wang (2013a), we use board size and board independence as a proxies 
for board structure. To capture the financial transparency of the firm, we look at the 
interaction term between audit committee independence and NYSE listing, where 
audit committee independence equals to one if audit committee consists entirely of 
independent directors, and NYSE listing is measured by a dummy variable that equals 
to one for the company listed on New York stock exchange. When the interaction 
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term equals to one, firm is expected to be more financially transparent, which will be 
expected to reduce default risk. Using insider ownership and institutional ownership 
to measure ownership structure, we also look at the effects of ownership structure on 
firm credit risk. In addition, the CEO of the firm plays an important role in corporate 
governance. CEO duality, when the CEO and chairman are the same is used as a 
proxy for CEO power, which is expected to increase the firm`s default risk.   
Formally, using these variables as governance mechanisms, we consider the 
following hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 1: During the financial-crisis period, default probabilities of financial 
firms should be higher than those of non-financial firms.  
 
Although financial firms are supervised more strictly than non-financial firms 
and are more likely to use derivatives (such as credit default swap) to hedge their risk, 
financial institutions, especially those operated in US, suffer heavily loss in the 2007-
8 global financial crisis period and the subprime crisis leads to higher decrease of 
credit rating for financial institutions which hold asset-backed securities4. Under the 
condition that Canadian market is highly connected with American market, if 
Canadian financial firms are highly exposed to American market, they are more likely 
to have higher credit risks. This can be supported by the fact that Accord financial 
corporation, a leading provider of financing solutions for small and medium sized 
business in Canada and the USA, holds 46% total assets operated in US.5 Furthermore, 
Brookfield asset management, which is a Canadian company offering real-estate 
investment, structured financial products services etc, has around 66% ($134 billion) 
of total assets under management in US.6 Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that 
financial firms will have higher credit risk over the financial crisis period. 
Hypothesis 2: corporate governance variables have different effects on financial firms 
and non-financial firms. 
Characteristics of financial firms are different from those of non-financial 
                                                        
4 Ryan (2012) contends that ratings downgrades for securities holding RMBS and CDO are 
frequent in the 2007-08 financial crisis period. 
5 See Accord Financial Corp 2008 annual report. 
6 See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brookfield_Asset_Management 
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firms. For example, due to financial firms facing more strict regulatory constraints 
than non-financial firms, boards of bank holding companies are more independent 
than those of unregulated manufacturing firms and banks have more shareholders than 
non-financial companies (Mehran and Adams, 2003; Mehran, 2011). Also, with more 
and more financial innovations, such as Residential mortgage-backed securities, 
banks become more and more incomprehensible and complex. Morgan (2002) 
supports that rating agencies make more disagreement on rating of bonds issued by 
banks than that of bonds issued by non-financial companies. Based on these previous 
papers, we know that there is an obvious difference in corporate governance between 
financial industry and non-financial industries. Consequently, it is reasonable to 
conclude that corporate governance factors impose differential effects on financial 
industry and non-financial industries.   
Hypothesis 3: Due to the political risk existed in Quebec province, credit risks of 
companies domiciled in Quebec province should be higher than those of Canadian 
firms domiciled outside of Quebec. 
Since 1970, political instability of Canada has been related to the possible 
separation of Quebec province from the Canadian federation. Especially for 1995 
Quebec referendum that the Quebec separation defeated by 50.6% to 49.4%, the 
outcome has a positive impact on stock market returns of Quebec firms (Beaulieu, 
Cosset and Essaddam, 2006). Confronting a higher political uncertainty of Quebec 
province, investors demand a higher rate of return from their investment in firms 
headquartered in Quebec province (Graham, Morrill & Morrill, 2000). Tirtiroglu, 
Bhabra and Lel (2004) find that viewing the announcement of business relocations 
from Quebec as good news, market participants have a positive reaction to financial 
markets. Furthermore, as Kesternich & Schnitzer (2010) note that the cost of debt of 
multinational firms increases with the political risk. Therefore, we expect that credit 
risks of firms headquartered in Quebec province will be higher than credit risks of 
Canadian firms headquartered outsider of Quebec province. 
Hypothesis 4: For board structure in both financial and non-financial firms, board size 
is positively related with its default probability, and board independence presents a 
mixed relation with its default probability. 
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Owing to limited research on the relation between board and credit risk, we 
would like to discuss board function in firm’s other aspects and then infer the 
correlation between board size and default probability. Using a sample of US banks 
from 2000 to 2010, Switzer and Jun (2013) argue that board size is negatively related 
with default probability because large boards are more likely to have greater expertise 
than small boards and it is more difficult for insiders to control large boards than 
small boards. However, there is no consensus on whether large size of board is good. 
Jensen (1993) finds that larger boards have more communication, cooperation 
problems, and internal conflicts. Furthermore, Eisenberg & Sundgren (1998) suggest 
that board size is negatively linked to firm performance. In this study, we would like 
to suppose that in post-financial crisis period, there is a positive connection between 
board size and firm credit risk. 
The board plays an important role in monitoring organizational activity. 
Switzer and Wang (2013) find that board independence imposes different effects on 
the credit risks of financial firms vs non-financial firms in the US. For board effect on 
firm performance, there is no uniform standpoint. Director’s independence has an 
ambiguous effect on director’s monitoring performance and his agency model shows 
that more outside directors in board may perform worse (Kumar, 2008). Black (2001) 
holds that there is an ambiguous correlation between board independence and firm 
performance. Therefore, we judge that there is a mixed result for correlation between 
board independence and default probability.  
Hypothesis 5: Depending on alignment effect and entrenchment effect, there is a non-
linear relationship between insider ownership and firm credit risk. 
 Aligning interests of managers with those of shareholders to reduce agency 
conflicts, shareholders often provide some stocks for insiders. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) hold that managerial ownership should be positively related with firm 
valuation because managerial ownership is in favor of aligning interests of managers 
and shareholders (alignment effect). For shareholders, they prefer to choose riskier 
projects with higher returns because their main purpose is to maximize their wealth 
even with sacrificing bondholder’s benefits. Therefore, at a low level of insider 
ownership (using insider ownership as a proxy for managerial ownership), we can 
expect that there is a positive relationship between insider ownership and credit risk. 
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However, due to their wealth “centralization”, insiders may not increase risk taking 
behaviors as they acquire higher levels of ownership (Jensen & Murphy, 1990; 
Wright and Ferris, 1997). Stulz (1988) finds that at a high level of managerial 
ownership (between 5% and 25%), entrenchment effect dominates and managerial 
ownership is negatively associated with firm valuation because managers pursue 
maximum personal benefit by encroaching on shareholder’s rights, meaning that 
managers, becoming more risk-averse and considering their reputation, would give up 
more risky projects and choose more conservative strategies. Thus, in a high level of 
insider ownership, insider ownership should be negatively linked to default 
probability. Bagnani, Milonas and Travlous (1994) prove the evidence that in a low 
level of managerial ownership (5 to 25 percent), managerial ownership is positively 
linked to bond return premium and in a high level (above 25 percent), there is a 
negative relation. Also, Switzer and Jun (2013) suggest that due to alignment effect 
and entrenchment effect, there is a nonlinear relationship between insider ownership 
and credit risk. Based on these previous papers, we predict that there is a non-linear 
correlation between insider ownership and firm credit risk.  
Hypothesis 6: Increased financial transparency is negatively related to default risk. 
To improve transparency, many regulators have required that firms’ audit, 
compensation, and nomination committees consist entirely of independent directors. 7 
Indeed, Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires that committees of firms listed in US consist 
wholly of independent directors. Higher audit committee independence is expected to 
be consistent with more transparency and higher quality of financial reporting 
(Armstrong, Core, and Guay, 2013). Therefore, many scholars use audit committee 
independence as a proxy for financial transparency (Sepgupta, 1998; Switzer and Jun, 
2013; Skaife, Collins, and LaFond, 2006). Firms with more financial transparency 
will have less information asymmetry with capital suppliers, resulting in a lower risk 
premium (Sepgupta, 1998). Also, Skaife, Collins, and LaFond (2006) find that firm 
credit ratings are positively associated with financial transparency.  
In this study, as Canadian firms listed on NYSE must comply with the 
Sarbanes-Oxley act which requires that the audit, compensation, and nomination 





committees be independent, and all non-financial firms in the sample, whether listed 
on the US stock exchanges or not have independent audit committees, one proxy that 
we use for financial transparency is the interaction term between audit committee 
independence and NYSE listing. The reason for using Canadian firms listed on NYSE, 
instead of using Canadian firms listed on all US stock exchanges as a criteria for 
financial transparency is that NYSE takes more strict rule to define independent 
directors than others US stock exchanges, and in contrast with that Nasdaq-listed 
companies can choose whether they have independent compensation and nomination 
committee or not, NYSE-listed companies must have independent compensation and 
nomination committees.8 Although under the heavily influence of the “SOX Act”, the 
Canadian securities regulators require that members of audit committee of firms listed 
on Toronto Stock Exchange be totally independent and financially literate, the 
Canadian Securities Administrators does not require that compensation and 
nomination committees of firms listed on Canadian stock exchanges be independent.9 
Due to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and more the strict requirement of independent 
committee directors in New York stock exchange, Canadian firms listed on NYSE are 
expected to be more financially transparent. In addition, it should be mentioned that in 
the sample, 9 financial firms (50 non-financial firms) are listed on New York Stock 
Exchange. Therefore, we hypothesize that the interaction term between audit 
committee independence and NYSE listing is negatively related to firm’s default risk. 
Hypothesis 7: CEO duality is positively related to its default probability. 
We use CEO duality to represent CEO power (consistent with Pathan, 2009). 
In management field, there is no agreed opinion on whether higher CEO power is 
good or bad. Supporters of CEO duality present that it is beneficial for effective 
operation (Stoeberl and Sherony, 1985). Opponents of CEO duality argue that it is 
harmful to governance function, such as the supervision of management (Mills, 1981). 
By using 212 large US bank holding companies over the 1997-2004 period, Pathan 
(2009) find that CEO power is negatively correlated with bank risk-taking because 
                                                        
8 The definition of independent directors in NYSE (Nasdaq) is that a director who made payments 
or received payments should not exceed 2% (5%) of the payment recipient’s gross revenues is 
independent. See http://www.thesecuritiesedge.com/2012/07/where-to-list-nyse-or-nasdaq/ 
9 The Canadian securities regulators just recommend that compensation and nomination 




managers are more likely to be risk-averse when CEO have more power.  However, 
Rechner and Dalton (1991) examine 141 corporations over six-year period to find that 
firms having higher CEO power underperform than those having independent 
leadership. In this paper, we predict that there is a positive relationship between CEO 
duality and default probability. 
4. Data Description  
 4.1 Sample and data source  
The sample consists of all Canadian firms (SIC codes from 1000 to 8711). 
Allowing for particularity of financial firms, we divide all firms into financial firms 
(SIC codes between 60 and 67) and non-financial firms. Resulting from a limited year 
of some governance variables checked as insider ownership, institutional ownership, 
financial transparency, and compensation committee independence, time periods of 
all regressions are mainly divided into two parts. For some regressions, the fiscal year 
is from 2008 to 2013 and these regressions only include board size, board 
independence, and CEO duality as explanatory variables. For others regressions 
including 7 governance variables, the fiscal year is from 2010 to 2013. In this study, 
the number of financial firms is 37 in two time periods. During a period from 2008 to 
2013 (from 2010 to 2013), there are 141 (170) non-financial firms. Furthermore, in 
the sample of financial (industrial) firms, there are 9 (50) firms listed on New York 
Stock Exchange. In the process of collecting data, the first step is to download all 
Canadian firms with board size, board independence and CEO duality from 
Bloomberg and then delete firms that missed data. Next, we upload Cusip of these 
samples to Compustat database and CFMRC database to obtain accounting variables 
and market variables separately. Finally, we use tickers of these samples to acquire 
Bloomberg five years default probabilities and committee independence from 
Bloomberg database. For committee independence that is absent from Bloomberg, we 
manually collect these variables from Datastream database.  
Owing to limited ownership summaries of Canadian companies that can be 
acquired from Thomson Reuters database, we obtain a percentage of insider 
ownership and of institutional ownership from Bloomberg database, as well as board 
size, board independence, audit and compensation committee independence obtained 
from Bloomberg database. CFMRC database offers market data, such as daily trading 
volume and daily return, for Canadian firms. Downloading daily return and daily 
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trading volume from CFMRC database, we then use these original data to calculate 
volatility and Amihud illiquidity for our samples. Accounting variables and SEC 
(stock exchange codes) are acquired from Compustat database. 
 
 4.2 Measuring default probability and corporate governance  
The dependent variable is Bloomberg five years default probabilities 
calculated by Merton DD model (Merton, 1974). By viewing the equity as a call 
option on the firm value with the strike price equal to its liabilities, the probability of 
firm asset value exceeding firm debts is calculated by the following equation. 











Where 𝑉0 is total Merton assets of the firm at time 0; 𝜎 is the asset volatility; 𝜇 is the 
asset drift; D is the debt liabilities of the firm; T is time to maturity; DD is the 
distance to default. Referring to 𝑉0 , it assumes that total value of a firm follows 
geometric Brownian motion, 
𝑑𝑉 = 𝜇𝑉𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑣𝑉𝑑𝑊 
Where V is the total value of the firm, 𝜇 is the mean rate of return on V, 𝜎𝑣 is the 
volatility of firm value and 𝑑𝑊  is a standard Wiener process. However, due to 
Merton DD model assuming that a firm can only default at the expiration date, 
Bloomberg incorporates the possibility that the firm defaults before the maturity of 
debt by treating equity as a 1-year barrier call option10. Furthermore, overcoming that 
Merton DD underestimates the true default probability over short horizon, Bloomberg 
creates a mapping between DD and actual default rates and employs a non-linear 
function of DD to express the Bloomberg default probability. The function is 
expressed as following, and f is a non-linear function. 
Default Probability = f (distance to default) 
From the econometric perspective, we transform default probabilities to LN 
(p/1-p), where p is Bloomberg five years default probabilities11. The independent 
variables are mainly separated into two categories, explanatory variables and control 
                                                        
10 Bloomberg credit risk DRSK <GO>, Framework, Methodology & Usage. 
11 The range of default probability is from 0 to 1. By using the transformation LN (P/1-P), the 




variables. For the first category, governance variables, including board structure, CEO 
power, financial transparency, compensation committee independence and ownership 
structure, are explanatory variables and are mainly acquired from Bloomberg, and 
Datastream database as supplement. As mentioned before, we employ board size (the 
number of directors in a board) and board independence (the percentage of 
independent directors over total directors) as a proxy for board structure. CEO duality, 
a dummy variable that equals to one if CEO and chairman are the same person and 
zero otherwise, is used to represent CEO power. The interaction term, as a proxy for 
financial transparency equals to one when both audit committee independence and 
NYSE listing equal to one, where audit committee independence equals to one if all 
directors in that committee are independent, zero otherwise, and NYSE listing equals 
to one for the firm listed on New York Stock Exchange, zero otherwise. 
Compensation committee independence equals to one if it is comprised wholly 
independent directors, and zero otherwise. Insider ownership is the percentage of 
stock held by insiders. Institutional ownership is the percentage of stock held by 
institutions. 
 
4.3 Control variables  
The other part is control variables, including accounting variables and market 
variables. The accounting variables include total assets, leverage, ROA, market to 
book ratio and asset tangibility. Total asset is the log of total assets to measure firm 
size. We expect that bigger firms are less likely to default because larger firms usually 
have better reputation or credit rating than smaller firms. Leverage is the ratio of total 
debts to total assets (the sum of item 34 and item 9, and then divided by item 6). 
Although debt can offer tax benefit, the effect of leverage on default probability can 
offset its benefits and leverage is highly negatively related with credit rating (Molina, 
2005). Therefore, we expect that companies with higher leverage will have higher 
default probabilities because higher leverage will expose bondholders to riskier 
situation and will improve firm’s financial costs. ROA is return on asset. Consistent 
with the calculation used by Imrohoroglu A, Tüzel S (2013), ROA is net income 
(Compustat item 18), minus dividends on preferred (item 19, if available), plus 
income statement deferred taxes (item 50, if available), and then scaled by total assets 
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(item 6). ROA is a proxy for profitability and more profitable companies will have 
lower default probabilities.  
For asset tangibility, although Kim and Chung (2010) predict that asset 
tangibility is beneficial for improving liquidity because payoff of tangible assets is 
easier to observe than that of intangible assets and it can reduce asymmetry 
information, they find that asset tangibility reduces stock liquidity. Therefore, asset 
tangibility might improve default probability. Based on Berger et al (1996), who find 
that a dollar of book value yields, on average, 72 cents in exit value for total 
receivables, 55 cents for inventory, and 54 cents for fixed assets, we firstly calculate 
tangibility and then scale tangibility by total book assets. Therefore, asset tangibility 
formula is presented as below (Almeida & Campello, 2007).  
Tangibility = 0.715 × Receivables + 0.547× Inventory + 0.535 × Capital+ CHE 
Where receivables are item 2 in Compustat, inventory is inventories-total (Compustat 
item 3), capital is Property, Plant and Equipment –Net (item 8), and CHE is cash and 
short-term investments (item 1). Market to book ratio is calculated by market values 
of assets over book values of assets. Due to a higher MB ratio representing a higher 
growth opportunity, we expect that firms with higher MB ratios will have lower 
default probabilities because higher growth opportunity is beneficial for stakeholders, 
as well as bondholders. In order to calculate market to book ratio, we firstly calculate 
market value of assets and then scale by book value of assets (item 6). The formula 
for calculating market value of assets is showed below (Chen and Zhao, 2006).  
MVA =PRCC*CSHPRI+DLC+DLTT+PSTKL-TXDITC 
Where PRCC is item 199, CSHPRI is item 54, DLC is item 34, DLTT is item 9, 
PSTKL is item 10 and TXDITC is item 35.  
The final part is market data, which includes stock volatility and Amihud 
illiquidity. By obtaining daily return and daily trading volume from CFMRC database, 
we calculate the standard deviation of daily returns as a proxy for stock volatility. 
Based on previous papers (Switzer and Wang 2013, Zhang and Zhou 2009), stock 
volatility is positively related with default probability. Amihud (2002) uses the 
average ratio of absolute daily return over the trading volume as a proxy for stock 









Where 𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑦 is illiquidity of stock i in year y, 𝐷𝑖𝑦 is the number of business days 
for stock i in year y, |𝑅𝑖𝑦𝑑| is the absolute value of stock i return on day t in year y, 
and 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑀𝑖𝑡𝑦 is the dollar trading volume of stock i on day t in year y. According to 
Kim and Chung (2010), corporate with better governance has lower illiquidity. 
Ericsson and Renault (2006) point out that stock market illiquidity are positively 
correlated with yield spread of corporate bonds (a proxy for default credit risk). 
Hence, it is reasonable to assume that there is a positive relationship between Amihud 
illiquidity and default probability.  
 
 4.4 Descriptive statistics 
Table II reports variables descriptive statistics for financial firms and industrial 
firms with a time period from 2008 to 2013 or from 2010 to 2013. The descriptive 
statistics include mean, median, standard deviation, Maximum, 75th percentile, 25th 
percentile and Minimum values for default probability, board size, board 
independence, CEO duality, volatility, Amihud illiquidity, asset tangibility, MB ratio, 
leverage, ROA and log of assets. The range of transformed default probability is 
about from -5.56895 to -0.8626. The higher transformed default probability still 
implies that the company is more likely to default. In the process of calculating 
Amihud illiquidity, we find that with a few trading volume in some days, some stocks 
is not very active, resulting that the standard deviation of Amihud illiquidity is very 
large. To reduce effects of Amihud illiquidity outliers, we winsorize Amihud 
illiquidity by setting the observations below the 1th and above the 99th percentile of 
the distribution to the values at the 1th and 99th percentiles. Except for Amihud 
illiquidity presented in panel B of table II, Amihud illiquidity of others panels in table 
II is winsorized at one percentile. Resulting from winsorization, the standard 
deviation of Amihud illiquidity is decreased a lot.  
Comparing financial firms with non-financial firms, we find that default 
probabilities of financial firms are higher than those of non-financial firms. This is 
consistent with our hypothesis that financial firms suffer more credit crisis during the 
crisis period than non-financial firms and more details about comparison of default 
probability between financial and industrial firms are presented in Table I. 
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Governance and control variables of financial firms are different from those of 
industrial firms. For example, board size, board independence, compensation 
committee independence in financial firms are higher than those in industrial firms, 
while CEO power, insider and institutional ownership of non-financial firms are 
higher. This is consistent with the rule that financial firms are more strictly supervised 
than industrial firms. Also, the size and leverage of financial firms is bigger than non-
financial firms.  
In addition, considering the property of industry, we define one for the big five 
banks in Canada (RBC, BMO, CIBC, TD and Scotiabank) and zero for the other 
financial firms. In industrial firms, mining industry with uncertain exploitation 
usually has higher uncertainty than the other industrial firms. Therefore, we define 
one for the mining industry (SIC code 10-14) and zero for the other industrial firms. 
For industrial firms and a time period from 2008 to 2013 (from 2010 to 2013), there 
are 372 (296) observations of mining industry and 474 (384) observations of the other 
industrial firms. From Table II, most of variables in the big five banks (the mining 
industry) is different from variables in the other financial firms (the other industrial 
firms) and their difference is quiet significant. Panel A of table II shows that default 
probabilities of big five banks are insignificantly smaller than those of the other 
financial firms, while big five banks are more likely to have higher credit risks than 
the other financial firms after the financial crisis period, which may be explained by 
larger financial firms preferring riskier projects. As is shown in panel C of table II, 
default probability of mining industry is significantly higher than that of the other 
industrial firms. For Amihud illiquidity in financial industry, the big five banks are 
always smaller than the other financial firms, meaning that stocks for big five banks 
are more active traded than the other financial firms. In non-financial firms, Amihud 
illiquidity of mining industry is lower than others industrial firms. Furthermore, 
comparing with the other financial firms, big five banks have higher board size, board 
independence, institutional ownership, financial transparency, compensation 
committee independence, asset tangibility, and firm size, while they have lower CEO 
power, insider ownership, volatility, MB ratio and return on asset. In contrast with the 
other industrial firms, firms in the mining industry have lower board size, leverage, 
return on asset, and firm size, but have higher CEO power, financial transparency, 
compensation committee independence, volatility, and asset tangibility.  
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Table III presents the Pearson correlation coefficients among default 
probability, corporate governance and control variables. The bold text indicates that 
the significance level is at or less than 0.01. On the one hand, board size, asset 
tangibility and firm size are significantly and positively related with default 
probabilities of financial firms. On the other hand, leverage, MB ratio and ROA are 
significantly negatively correlated with default probabilities of financial firms. For 
industrial firms, there is a significantly negative correlation between board size, 
financial transparency, MB ratio, ROA, firm size and default probabilities, while 
volatility, Amihud illiquidity and asset tangibility are significantly positive linked to 
default probabilities. Besides the correlation between independent variables and a 
dependent variable, although some independent variables are mutually correlated, 
most of their significant coefficients are less than 0.5. Thus, it is not necessary for us 
to consider the multicollinearity problem. As is shown in Table III, board size 
presents mixed results for financial firms and industrial firms and this is not consistent 
with our hypothesis. Therefore, in next section, we will use some regressions to test 
the relationship between default probabilities and governance variables. 
 
4.5 Methodology 
In order to test the relation between various governance variables and default 
probabilities, we run the regression as follows after controlling firm and security 
specification. The primary model is presented as below. 
 
𝐿𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1(𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡) + 𝛼2(𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡) 
 +𝛼3(𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡) + 𝛼4(𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡) 
+𝛼5(𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡)
2+𝛼6(𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡) 
+𝛼7(𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑖𝑡) + 𝛼8(𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡) 
+𝛼9(𝑖𝑛𝑑 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡) + 𝛼10(𝑂𝑁 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡) 
+𝛼11(𝑄𝐶 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡)+𝛼12(𝑊𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡) 




Where for financial firms, if the company is the big five banks, industry dummy 
equals to one and zero otherwise. For industrial firms, the mining industry equals to 
one and zero otherwise. Transparency is an interaction term measured by that audit 
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committee independence multiply NYSE listing. Lndefprob is defined as LN (P/1-P), 
where P is default probability. Allowing for different laws for regulating companies in 
various Canadian provinces, we insert province dummy to test whether there is a 
province effect on default probability. ON dummy equals to one if the company is 
located in Ontario province and zero otherwise, QC dummy equals to one if 
headquarter of the company is located in Quebec province, and Western dummy 
equals to one if the company is domiciled in British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan 
and the west Manitoba province. Finally, to test whether the global financial crisis 
effect is decreasing with the time goes by, we use the year trend and expect that the 
sign should be negative. In addition, 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 is defined as control variables including 
market and firm characteristic variables. Market variables include volatility and 
Amihud illiquidity variable, and firm characteristic variables include leverage, MB 
ratio, asset tangibility, ROA, and firm size.  
Also, from the descriptive statistics, we know that the big five banks is 
different from the other financial firms and there are some differences between the 
mining industry and the other industrial firms. Therefore, we will consider the 
interaction effect between governance variables and industry dummy on default 
probability. To test effects of different combination between governance variable and 
industry dummy on default probabilities, we employ the following regression. 
 
𝐿𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1(𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡) + 𝛼2(𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑑 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡) 
+𝛼3(𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡) + 𝛼4(𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑑 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑑 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡)  
 +𝛼5(𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡) + 𝛼6(𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑑 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡) 
+𝛼7(𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡) +  𝛼8(𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡)
2 
+𝛼9(𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡) + 𝛼10(𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡) 
+𝛼11(𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡) + 𝛼12(𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑑 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑑 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡) 
+𝛼13(𝑖𝑛𝑑 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡) + 𝛼14(𝑂𝑁 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡) 





As mentioned above, our regressions are mainly divided into two parts because 
of limited data for some governance variables. For the first part, the time period is 
from 2008 to 2013, governance variables only include board size, board independence 
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and CEO duality and observations of financial (industrial) firms are 222 (846). Also, 
the year is numbered consecutively. In the first part, year trend equals to one if the 
year is 2008, equals to two if the year is 2009 and equals to six until the year is 2013. 
For the second part, where the time period is from 2010 to 2013 and 148 observations 
in financial firms and 680 observations in non-financial firms, more governance 
variables, such as insider and institutional ownership, interaction, compensation 
committee independence, are included. The year trend equals to one if the year is 
2010, equals to two if the year is 2011 and equals to four until the year is 2013.  
 
 5. Empirical Results  
As can be seen from table II, average default probabilities of financial firms 
are always higher than those of industrial firms. In table I, default probabilities in 
financial firms are always greater than those in non-financial firms from 2008 to 2012, 
while the default probability difference between financial firms and industrial firms is 
decreasing. From 2008 to 2009, default probabilities of financial firms are 
significantly greater than those of non-financial firms and the difference is decreased 
from 0.00745 in 2008 to 0.00441 in 2009, but the result does not suggest that there is 
a lack of soundness of the Canadian banking system. Indeed, the higher default 
probabilities for financial firms is driven by insurance and real estate companies. 
Many of these companies have high exposure to the US real estate market, whose 
collapse was a harbinger of the global financial crisis. However, after 2009, the 
differential riskiness between financial and non-financial firms is no longer apparent. 
Indeed by 2013, the default probability of industrial firms exceeds that of financial 
firms. Given the strong performance of the Canadian banking system during the 2007-
8 financial crisis (Arjani and Paulin, 2013), we separately analyze banks (SIC codes: 
60-61) from other financial firms and then compare their credit risks to the credit risk 
of non-financial firms. We find that although default risks of banks are slightly higher 
than those of industrial firms during 2008-09 (0.0291 vs 0.0288), the difference is not 
significant.  
Table IV shows the results of regression models that link transformed default 
probabilities to governance variables and control variables. As are shown in table IV, 
with the exception of firm size, control variables that are significant in both financial 
and industrial firms have the same sign in financial and industrial firms. For financial 
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firms, higher volatility, Amihud illiquidity and leverage, lower market to book ratio, 
higher asset tangibility, and larger firm size are associated with higher default 
probabilities. Except for firm size, control variables are consistent with our predicted 
sign. It is possible that larger financial firms are more likely to take riskier projects 
than smaller financial firms. In industrial firms, companies with higher volatility and 
leverage, lower market to book ratio, higher asset tangibility, lower ROA, and smaller 
size are more likely to default. All these control variables in industrial firms are 
consistent with our predicted sign in previous part. Larger industrial firms enjoy 
economies of scale and have a higher reputation, resulting in lower default probability.  
Similarly, a number governance variables have differential effects for financial 
as opposed to industrial firms. As is shown in table IV, board independence is 
positively associated with default probabilities of financial firms but is insignificantly 
and negatively related with default probabilities of industrial firms, consistent with 
our hypothesis. Institutional ownership impacts negatively (positively) on the default 
probability of financial (non-financial) firms. The results for non-financial firms are 
thus consistent with scholars who assert that institutional investors tend to support 
shareholder’s strategy to maximize firm’s value and discourage corporate 
diversification strategies used to reduce firm risk (Hill & Snell, 1988; Brickley, Lease 
& Smith, 1988), meaning that with the increase of institutional ownership, firm credit 
risk is rising (Hansen & Hill, 1991). The results for the financial firms, on the other 
hand, are consistent with the contention that institutions play a monitoring role in 
corporate governance that reduce credit risk, and that they have a preference in lower 
risk companies, with higher ratings and lower default probabilities (Bhojraj & 
Sengupta, 2003).  
Regarding the effects of insider ownership, both an alignment effect and 
entrenchment are observed, resulting in a non-linear relationship between insider 
ownership and default probability. For financial firms, at a low level of insider 
ownership, the alignment effect dominates and default probability increases with a 
rise of insider ownership, meaning that incentives of insiders are aligned with those of 
shareholders who are more inclined to choose more risky projects with encroaching 
on bondholder’s benefits. As the insider ownership rises and reaches its inflection 
point (33% in this sample) the entrenchment effect dominates and default probability 
decreases. This result conforms to Wright, Ferris, and Sarin (1996), Kim and Lu 
(2011), and Switzer and Wang (2013a), who show that there is non-linear relationship 
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between CEO ownership and firms credit risks. However, as is shown in panel B of 
table IV, there is a convex relationship between insider ownership and default 
probabilities of industrial firms. At a low level of insider ownership, there is a 
negative relationship between insider ownership and firms default risks. With the 
increasing of insider ownership, it becomes a positive correlation. Although 
coefficients of insider ownership and of insider ownership square term are significant 
in models presented in panel B of table IV, they are not significant in a model that 
only includes insider ownership and the square term of insider ownership. Therefore, 
we can infer that the non-linear relationship is not stable in non-financial firms and 
the inflection point for industrial firms does not really exist. In table IV, compensation 
independence shows a different correlation with default probabilities in financial VS 
industrial firms. Financial transparency, as delegated by interaction term between 
audit committee independence and NYSE listing is shown to be negatively (positively) 
related to default probabilities in industrial firms (financial firms).  
However, some governance variables display the same relation in both 
financial firms and non-financial firms. For example, consistent with our hypothesis, 
default probability is positively related to board size. The result is opposite with that 
presented in Switzer and Jun (2013). The result convinces us that larger boards are 
more likely to have communication problems and internal conflicts. As a proxy for 
CEO power, CEO duality is positively associated with firm’s default, meaning that 
the separation of CEO and chairman is beneficial for company to reduce firm credit 
risk. The result is also consistent with our hypothesis.  
As discussed before, after considering industries characteristics, we insert 
industry dummy and add interaction effects between governance variables and 
industry into our regression. In panel A of table IV, board size and board 
independence play a more important role in the big five banks than in the other 
financial institutions. Financial firms with larger board size and higher board 
independence are more inclined to default, while the big five banks with higher board 
size and board independence have lower firm credit risk. For non-financial firms, 
board independence, CEO power and compensation independence have more effects 
on the mining industry than the other industrial companies. Especially for CEO 
duality, due to the mining industry having higher risk, CEO in the mining industry 
might be more risk-averse than CEO in the other industry, resulting that CEO with 
more power in the mining industry can reduce firm credit risk. In the mining industry, 
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when compensation becomes more independent, firms will have less probability to 
default. From the coefficients of year trend in financial and non-financial regressions, 
default probabilities are consecutively decreasing from 2008 to 2013.  
To control for firm fixed effects and year effects, we use Fama-Macbeth 
regressions as a robustness tests of these relationships. In column 3 of Panel A table 
IV, except that board independence becomes positively associated with default, 
coefficients of board size and CEO duality still keep the same sign in Fama-Macbeth 
model as in original model. Interestingly, we find that in Fama-Macbeth regression, 
financial firms in Ontario and Quebec have higher default probabilities and financial 
firms credit risks in western provinces are lower than those in others Canadian 
provinces and. In column 10 of Panel A table IV, although there is no concave 
relationship between insider ownership and firm default, some governance variables 
still impact on default in the Fama-Macbeth regressions as in OLS models. For non-
financial firms and as is shown in column 11 of panel B table IV, insider ownership 
still displays a convex relationship with default risk. In addition, as is shown in 
column 3 of panel B table IV, although the significance level is low, industrial firms 
defaults are higher in Quebec than others Canadian provinces. Thus, we conclude that 
credit risks of firms domiciled in Quebec province are higher than those of Canadian 
firms domiciled outside of Quebec.  
To summarize, board size and CEO power have the same effects on default 
probabilities of financial firms and non-financial firms, while some factors, such as 
board independence, institutional ownership, financial transparency, as well as 
compensation independence, affecting firm credit risk considerably differ between 
financial and non-financial firms. Contrary to a concave relationship between insider 
ownership and default probabilities of financial firms, a convex relationship is shown 
in industrial firms. Financial transparency has a negatively (positively) effect on 
default probabilities in industrial firms (financial firms). Finally, because of political 
uncertainty in Quebec, firms default risks are higher in Quebec than others Canadian 
provinces. 
 
6. Conclusions  
Our empirical results shed light on effects of several factors that affect the 
default risk of financial and non-financial firms in Canada. As hypothesized, firms 
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with higher volatility, higher leverage, lower market to book ratio, and higher asset 
tangibility experience larger default probabilities. We also find that several 
governance mechanisms play a role in affecting default risk. 
 During the global financial crisis, financial firms experienced higher default 
risk than non-financial firms. Since the end of the crisis period, the default risk of 
financial firms has fallen at a more rapid pace. This may reflect increased 
conservatism of financial institutions or more stringent supervisory constraints, such 
as required compliance with Dodd Frank legislation for Canadian firms with US 
operations. A number of governance mechanisms have differential effects between 
financial firms and non-financial firms.  For example, we observe negative (positive) 
relationships between compensation committee independence, institutional ownership 
and default risk are observed for financial (non-financial) firms. Financial 
transparency is positively (negatively) related to the credit risk of financial (non-
financial) firms. Board independence have a positive effect on credit risks of financial 
firms, while board independence does not affect default risks of non-financial firms. 
However, for all firms in our sample, consistent with our hypotheses, increased board 
size, and higher CEO power are associated with higher default probabilities. 
Exploring why some mechanisms are not as effective, or have differential impacts 
between financial and non-financial firms remains a topic for future research. 
Finally, our study also suggests that the effects of differential political risk 
combined with regulatory differences across the regions of Canada may have 
substantive effects on firm riskiness. In particular, in some of the Fama-Macbeth 
regression models, firms domiciled in Quebec are shown to have higher credit risks 
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Default N Mean Std
Financial firms 35 0.0408 0.0206
Non-financial firms 141 0.0334 0.0321
Difference 0.00745 0.0302
P-value 0.0945*
Default N Mean Std
Financial firms 36 0.0287 0.0125
Non-financial firms 141 0.0242 0.0171
Difference 0.00441 0.0163
P-value 0.086*
Default N Mean Std
Financial firms 37 0.0186 0.0112
Non-financial firms 170 0.0158 0.0122
Difference 0.00282 0.012
P-value 0.1778
Default N Mean Std
Financial firms 37 0.0204 0.0105
Non-financial firms 170 0.0188 0.0146
Difference 0.00156 0.014
P-value 0.4509
Default N Mean Std
Financial firms 37 0.0175 0.00957
Non-financial firms 170 0.0174 0.0152
Difference 0.000092 0.0144
P-value 0.9627
Default N Mean Std
Financial firms 37 0.0156 0.00776





Table I : difference in each year default probability between 
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 i a
t tim
e
 t, a
n
d
 th
e
 tra
n
sfo
rm
a
tio
n
 fo
r d
e
fa
u
lt is L
N
(p
/1
-p
). L
o
g
size
 is th
e
 L
o
g
 o
f to
ta
l a
sse
t. R
O
A
 is th
e
 re
tu
rn
 o
n
 a
sse
t. 
A
sse
t-ta
n
g
ib
ility
 is c
a
lc
u
la
te
d
 b
y
 th
e
 fo
rm
u
la
 p
re
se
n
te
d
 b
y
 A
lm
e
id
a
 &
 C
a
m
p
e
llo
 (2
0
0
7
). M
B
 is d
e
fin
e
d
 a
s m
a
rk
e
t v
a
lu
e
 to
 b
o
o
k
 v
a
lu
e
. L
e
v
e
ra
g
e
 is e
stim
a
te
d
 a
s to
ta
l d
e
b
t to
 
to
ta
l a
sse
t. A
m
ih
u
d
 illiq
u
id
ity
 is th
e
 a
v
e
ra
g
e
 ra
tio
 o
f a
b
so
lu
te
 d
a
ily
 re
tu
rn
 o
v
e
r th
e
 tra
d
in
g
 v
o
lu
m
e
. V
o
la
tility
 is th
e
 sta
n
d
a
rd
 d
e
v
ia
tio
n
 o
f d
a
ily
 sto
c
k
 re
tu
rn
s. B
o
a
rd
 size
 is th
e
 to
ta
l 
n
u
m
b
e
r o
f d
ire
c
to
rs o
n
 a
 b
o
a
rd
. B
o
a
rd
 in
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
c
e
 is d
e
fin
e
d
 a
s th
e
 n
u
m
b
e
r o
f in
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t d
ire
c
to
rs o
v
e
r n
u
m
b
e
r o
f to
ta
l d
ire
c
to
rs. C
E
O
 d
u
a
lity
 e
q
u
a
ls to
 o
n
e
 if C
E
O
 a
n
d
 
c
h
a
irm
a
n
 a
re
 th
e
 sa
m
e
 p
e
rso
n
, 0
 o
th
e
rw
ise
. In
sid
 is th
e
 p
e
rc
e
n
t o
f o
u
tsta
n
d
in
g
 sh
a
re
s h
e
ld
 b
y
 to
p
 m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t a
n
d
 d
ire
c
to
rs. In
sid
tw
o
 is sq
u
a
re
 te
rm
 o
f in
sid
e
r h
o
ld
in
g
. In
stit is 
th
e
 e
stim
a
te
d
 p
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 o
f o
u
tsta
n
d
in
g
 sh
a
re
s h
e
ld
 b
y
 in
stitu
tio
n
s. T
ra
n
sp
a
re
n
c
y
 is p
ro
x
ie
d
 b
y
 th
e
 in
te
ra
c
tio
n
 te
rm
 b
e
tw
e
e
n
 a
u
d
it c
o
m
m
itte
e
 in
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
c
e
 a
n
d
 N
Y
S
E
 listin
g
, 
w
h
e
re
 a
u
d
it c
o
m
m
itte
e
 in
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
c
e
 e
q
u
a
ls to
 o
n
e
 if a
u
d
it c
o
m
m
itte
e
 c
o
n
sist e
n
tire
ly
 o
f in
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t d
ire
c
to
rs, 0
 o
th
e
rw
ise
, a
n
d
 N
Y
S
E
 listin
g
 e
q
u
a
ls to
 1
 if th
e
 c
o
m
p
a
n
y
 is liste
d
 
o
n
 N
e
w
 Y
o
rk
 sto
c
k
 e
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
, 0
 o
th
e
rw
ise
. C
o
m
p
e
n
 e
q
u
a
ls to
 o
n
e
 if c
o
m
p
e
n
sa
tio
n
 c
o
m
m
itte
e
 is w
h
o
lly
 c
o
m
p
rise
d
 o
f in
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t d
ire
c
to
rs, 0
 o
th
e
rw
ise
. In
d
 d
u
m
m
y
 e
q
u
a
ls to
 1
 
if th
e
 firm
 is in
 m
in
in
g
 in
d
u
stry
, 0
 o
th
e
rw
ise
. O
N
 d
u
m
m
y
 (Q
C
 d
u
m
m
y
) e
q
u
a
ls to
 1
 if th
e
 c
o
m
p
a
n
y
 is h
e
a
d
q
u
a
rte
re
d
 in
 O
n
ta
rio
 p
ro
v
in
c
e
 (Q
u
e
b
e
c
 p
ro
v
in
c
e
), 0
 o
th
e
rw
ise
.  
W
e
ste
rn
 d
u
m
m
y
 e
q
u
a
ls to
 1
 if th
e
 c
o
m
p
a
n
y
 is d
o
m
ic
ile
d
 in
 A
B
, B
C
, M
B
 w
e
st a
n
d
 S
K
 p
ro
v
in
c
e
, 0
 o
th
e
rw
ise
. P
-v
a
lu
e
s a
re
 re
p
o
rte
d
 b
e
lo
w
 th
e
 v
a
ria
b
le
 c
o
e
ffic
ie
n
t. *
*
*
,*
*
,*
 
d
e
n
o
te
 sta
tistic
a
l sig
n
ific
a
n
c
e
 a
t th
e
 1
%
, 5
%
, a
n
d
 1
0
%
 le
v
e
l. 
P
a
n
e
l B
: N
o
n
- F
in
a
n
c
ia
l F
irm
s
B
o
a
rd
 size
B
o
a
rd
 size
*
d
u
m
m
y
B
o
a
rd
 in
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
c
e
in
d
e
p
e
n
d
*
d
u
m
m
y
C
E
O
 d
u
a
lity
C
E
O
*
d
u
m
m
y
in
sid
in
sid
tw
o
le
v
e
ra
g
e
c
o
m
p
e
n
c
o
m
p
e
n
*
d
u
m
m
y
In
d
 d
u
m
m
y
 
O
N
 d
u
m
m
y
Q
C
 d
u
m
m
y
W
e
ste
rn
 d
u
m
m
y
 
Y
e
a
r T
re
n
d
v
o
l
a
m
ih
u
d
N
u
m
m
b
 ra
tio
a
sse
t-ta
n
g
ib
ility
ro
a
lo
g
size
In
te
rc
e
p
t
A
d
j R
-sq
